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I would like to discuss in this paper some of my
feelings about the state of research in organizational
psychology, especially as it pertains to that difficult
concept--organizational culture. I will begin with two
stories. At a recent symposium on telecommunications I was
sitting next to the President of one of the major providers
of such services. A professor was analyzing the market
penetration of different companies in different parts of the
world and made several references to my neighbor's company.
He was getting increasingly agitated and finally said to me:
"Its wonderful what these professors can make up in the way
of a story on company data that happen to be completely
wrong."
The second story was told to me by a colleague who had
been part of a research team to study how a large British
corporation had managed some of its major changes over the
last decade. The research program called for "accurate data"
hence all interviews with members of the company were to be
tape recorded. My colleague reported a particular instance
where the manager whom he was about to interview said: "Do
you want to hear the official story or do you want me to tell
you what really happened?" My colleague replied that he of
course wanted to know what really happened. The manager then
said: "In that case you better turn that tape recorder off."
My colleague was there with a teammate, and reported that the
peer pressure was such that he said: "I'm afraid we'll have
to leave the tape on and just hear the official story." The
taped data were then fed into a larger data pool from which a
book was written about this case. I believe these two
stories set the proper tone for what I want to say.
In the first part of this paper I would like to make
some observations about how we learn in this field and how I
believe we should do research. I will argue that we have
largely adopted a traditional research paradigm that has not
worked very well, a paradigm that has produced very reliable
results about very unimportant things, and sometimes possibly
invalid results altogether. In that process I believe we
have lost touch with some of the important phenomena that go
on in organizations, or have ignored them simply because they
were too difficult to study by the traditional methods
available. All too often we are not willing to turn off the
tape recorder.
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3I. The Clinical Research Paradigm
In place of the traditional research paradigm based on
quantitative measurement and statistical significance, I
would like to propose that we learn to gather data in natural
situations and particularly in "clinical" situations where we
are asked in one way or another to help an organization
(Schein, 1987a). We not only need to learn to gather data in
these settings by basic inquiry methods, but we also need to
train ourselves to become more helpful and, thereby, get
access to organizational situations where clients want
something of us. And then, and this is perhaps the most
difficult challenge of all, we need to be able to report such
data, to learn from them, and to treat them as legitimate
scientific data in organizational research. So what I am
calling "clinical research" is the observation, elicitation,
and reporting of data that are available when we are actively
engaged in helping organizations.
We must not confuse clinical research with qualitative
research or ethnographic research. What is broadly labelled
qualitative or ethnographic or participant observer based
research still operates from the traditional scientific
model. In this model the investigator at her own initiative
requests entry or infiltrates the research site and makes
observations without disturbing the situation. In some
models of research, the less you influence the research site,
the better a researcher you are.
4In the classical Hawthorne studies, you will remember,
we made a fetish out of the fact that the observer could be
shown to have no effect on the members of the Bank Wiring
Room. Only later did we realize the power of the Hawthorne
effect, that actively observing workers and paying attention
to them had more impact on their morale and productivity than
any of the variables manipulated in the formal study.
The person who understood this best was Kurt Lewin, and
I still believe he had it right when he noted that one cannot
understand a human system without tryina to chanae it. It is
in the attempt to change the system that some of the most
important characteristics of the system reveal themselves,
phenomena that even the most talented ethnographer would not
discover unless he happened to be present when someone else
was trying to produce some change.
Clinical research, then, is an extension of the concept
of action research as articulated by Lewin and his followers,
but it differs from action research in a very important
respect. The essence of clinical research is that someone in
the organization has requested some form of help and that the
researcher comes into the situation in response to the needs
of the client, not her own needs to aather data. Some action
research fits this model, but there is nothing in the concept
of action research per se that focuses on client needs as a
necessary condition for relevant data to surface.
So not only does clinical research result from helping
activities that are client driven, but the clinician is aid
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for his services and enters a psychological contract that
obliaates him to be helpful. This implies that the
clinician gives higher priority to the helping process than
the research process, and that the researcher has helping
skills, not only research skills, or she might not be given
access in the first place. But once the helping relationship
exists, the possibilities for learning what really goes on in
organizations are enormous if we learn to take advantage of
them and if we learn to be good and reliable observers of
what is going on.
Why do I think the possibilities are enormous? There
are several reasons. First, if we examine the psycholoaical
contract in the traditional research situation and the
clinical situation, we will discover an important
difference. In the traditional situation the researcher has
to develop a site, gain entry, and establish himself as
someone who will not be too great a pain to have around. The
deal is that the researcher will be allowed to hang around,
interview people, maybe even administer questionnaires,
provided she does not do too much harm to the organization
and provided that whoever approved the entry feels that he is
going to get some benefit from seeing the research results.
But notice that there is nothing in the situation that would
motivate a member of the organization to put much time or
effort into helping the researcher, and there is certainly
nothing in the situation that would motivate her to reveal
some of her deeper observations or attitudes.
6The ethnographer might argue that if he hangs around
enough, important things will reveal themselves, but I doubt
that this will be true unless the ethnographer has come to be
seen as helpful to have around and has, therefore, migrated
into a clinical relationship with his "subjects." A striking
example of this kind of migration occurred some years ago in
an effort of one our graduate students to become a
participant observer in an engineering group of a local high
tech company. He felt himself to be on the periphery of
things for many weeks until one day at lunch time an informal
soccer game took place and he scored the winning goal for his
group. Suddenly he had a role, albeit a non-work related
role, and from that day on he was accepted as a member of the
group and people began to share with him how they really felt
about things. Significantly, a central part of this role
became "clinical" in that he was increasingly asked by
various members of the group for advice on how to handle
certain situations. It was his ability to help that gained
him real entry into the group, not his research skills. And
the more he helped, the more the members of the group felt
obligated and anxious to help him by spending time with him
explaining how things really worked and sharing their
feelings about about what was going on.
If you stop to think about it, the traditional research
situation, by its very nature, will only produce superficial
data unless you use unobtrusive methods or manipulate the
situation experimentally, both of which are hard to do and
7often unethical in organizational situations. Once the
situation has been defined as clinical, however, where the
group members want help from the outsider, the psychological
contract shifts dramatically. We now have a reverse
psychological flow. In the traditional situation the
researcher wanted something from reluctant organization
members, and had relatively little to offer in return. In
the clinical situation, clients want something from the
helper, are willing to pay for it, and, most important, lay
themselves open to being questioned by the clinician on
matters that may be regarded under other circumstances as
private or secret, or "dirty linen."
If I am a traditional researcher, and ask: "How do you
get along with your boss?" the respondent may evade giving an
answer because it may be viewed as being none of my business.
If I ask the same question as part of a process of helping
the client to solve some problem, it is much more likely that
I will get a meaningful answer because the client is seeking
help and paying for it. The very fact that the client has
initiated the process, licenses the clinician researcher to
ask questions that would under other circumstances be viewed
as invasions of privacy or be evaded in order to maintain an
image. And, of course, because the client is paying for the
help, he obligates himself to give answers in order to "get
his money's worth."
An effective ethnographer or interviewer operating from
the traditional model will argue that her skill in
8establishing a relationship with the "subjects" or "natives"
will elicit trust and, therefore, equivalently deep data.
But I would argue that when that happens, it happens because
the relationship has, in fact, gradually come to be redefined
as a helping relationship from the client's point of view.
And this can happen even if the researcher has no helping
skills or intentions, which creates the awkward possibility
that the client's trust is, in fact, misplaced. The
researcher may be quite unable or unwilling to help, and is
likely to disappear as soon as he has enough data. If the
researcher is able to be helpful, a healthy, productive,
mutually beneficial relationship results. In the ideal
situation, then, both the researcher role and helper role are
needed, and often can be found in the same person.
In either case, what the researcher is told or what she
observes is not automatically deeper or more valid. There is
still the problem of psychological defenses and the need to
give socially desirable responses. The client will still
have reasons to evade, avoid, idealize, deny, project, and in
other ways distort what is going on, but the defenses now
become data about the organization rather than being simply a
product of the researcher/subject relationship. If the
person refuses the traditional researcher with "its none of
your business," little has been learned and the researcher
has no legitimate right to pursue the matter with follow-up
questions.
9In the clinical relationship the same evasive response
or a response like "I get along fine with my boss" said in a
tone that conveys that something else may, in fact, be going
on, suggests hypotheses about the climate in the organization
that can be legitimately followed up. For example, the
person might be afraid of his boss, or the person might be
protective of his boss, which are hypotheses now about a
state of affairs in the organization that can be pursued with
further inquiry questions. The point is that in the clinical
relationship the clinician is permitted and expected to
continue the conversation by asking for further information,
or probing for what might be behind the response. If the
person adamantly refuses, one can legitimately ask what might
be going on that would cause such a refusal and pursue the
inquiry.
It is in this interactive process that the clinical
relationship differs most from the traditional research
relationship. The clinical researcher can formulate
hypotheses about what is going on and test them "on line" by
the kinds of interventions she makes. And, in observing the
responses to interventions, the clinician is confirming or
disconfirming hypotheses, and is constantly gathering more
data for reformulating hypotheses. This interactive process
is what I mean by learning about an organization in the
process of trying to change it. Interventions in this
context then become research tools and can be used to do mini
"field experiments."
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II. Process Consultation as a Form of Helping
The next issue to be addressed, then, is what should we
mean by an "intervention." Organizations are, by definition,
open dynamic systems. Therefore, anythina I do as a
clinician or researcher is an intervention that will produce
some unknown amount of change. The illusion among some
researchers or ethnographers that they can go into
organizations without influencing them has been the source of
a great deal of misunderstanding. Instead of attempting to
maintain this fiction or to argue for minimal influence, why
not acknowledge that any appearance of an outsider on the
organization's doorstep is an intervention? The issue, then,
is to decide what kinds of interventions are desirable.
Here we come to a central tenet of how I believe we can
be most helpful and how I would distinguish my clinical
approach from that of many others. Consultants and helpers
must be able to be what I have called "process consultants"
which means that the client is encouraged to become actively
involved in diagnosing his own situation and helping to
formulate interventions that will work in his culture
(Schein, 1987b, 1988). What this means in practice is that
as a helper I must make interventions whose primary function
is to stimulate inquiry and diagnosis. I must ask genuine
questions and develop a genuine curiosity about what is going
on in the client's world so that the client comes to see me
as a person who is helpful to have around.
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It has been my experience that when I am in this kind of
process consultant role, pursuing as best I can a process of
pure inquiry, that I also learn most as a researcher because
the client becomes more and more motivated to reveal to me
what she believes is going on. A level of trust builds up
that allows me then to ask very probing questions without
feeling that I am treading on private turf. This level of
trust also often results in being invited to attend meetings
or to observe real work getting done, permitting me to check
whether my developing image of what is going on has any
validity.
If, on the other hand, I come in as an expert or a
doctor with ready made diagnostic tools, tests, and
prescriptions, I will learn less and will be less likely to
be helpful because I will not know enough about the realities
of the client's world to know what prescription would in fact
be helpful. I will stimulate unknown amounts of dependence
or counterdependence, either of which would undermine
inquiry.
The process of inquiry as conducted by a process
consultant is an attempt to meet the client wherever she is
and to work with the reality as it is defined. If a formal
diagnostic process such as psychological testing or employee
surveying is to be done, the decision to do it must be owned
fully by the initial client with full knowledge of the
potential consequences. As a process consultant I have to
make those consequences clear and to point out that such
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diagnostic processes are typically major interventions into
the organization. The consultant should never do just what
the client requests or demands, but always insure that the
client fully understands and accepts the potential
consequences.
I reject out of hand the proposal by some managerial
psychologist to routinely give tests, do assessments, or do
surveys as an initial diagnostic process. Though these are
labelled as "diagnostic" they are, in fact, major
interventions with unknown consequences, and in the early
stages of a relationship the client is simply not in a
position to assess what those consequences might be.
Two examples will make this clear. In the use of
surveys, the early administration of questionnaires for
diagnostic purposes often raises employee expectations that
management cannot meet, or creates an illusion of empowerment
among employees that does not reflect reality. Because the
survey is defined as "merely" diagnostic, insufficient
attention is paid to the method by which feedback will be
given to participants. If the feedback does not occur or is
mishandled, the organizational situation will worsen
substantially as a result of the survey administration.
On the use of psychological tests and assessments, I
have recently read a book on psychological consulting to
management in which the author outlines as his primary method
the following steps. A CEO will call him in with a
presenting problem. In order to help, the psychologist will
MI!
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reauire that the CEO and his immediate subordinates undergo a
psychological assessment, with the argument that unless he
obtains such data he cannot really determine what might be
going on in the organization. Unfortunately, nowhere does
this same author spell out the possible consequences to the
CEO and his team of all of them being subjected to a
psychological assessment. Nothing is said about the process
by which the CEO might get the consent of his subordinates,
nor is any attention given to the possibility that some
members of the team may not be psychologically ready for an
assessment. As a process consultant the clinician must get
full understanding and ownership from the immediate client of
any such proposed diagnostic or other intervention if a
healthy helping relationship is to be formed.
To summarize thus far, the essence of the clinical
research relationship is 1) that the client wants help and is
therefore more likely to reveal important data and 2) that
the clinician researcher is expected to intervene which
allows new data about the client system to be surfaced. The
data thus revealed will allow the researcher to get a deeper
insight particularly into 1) the psychological defenses
operating in the organization, 2) the cultural assumptions
that are driving the organization, and 3) the interpersonal
and group dynamics that are operating, and 4) how power and
authority operates in the organization. In building the
helping relationship it is important to function in a process
and inquiry mode so that the client can participate in
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diagnostic activities and learn to own the consequences of
whatever further interventions are made.
III. The Clinical Approach to the Study of
Organizational Culture
How does this point of view impact the study of
organizational cultures? As you well know, there are in our
field now many definitions of culture and a number of so
called culture surveys that purport to tell an organization,
based on a set of individual interview or questionnaire
responses what the important elements of its culture are.
The development of these technologies is a direct reflection
of our traditional research paradigms and clearly leads to
superficial data, possibly even invalid data. The reason is
that in order to develop a questionnaire, one has to
understand in depth the phenomenon one is surveying, and I do
not see how that deeper knowledge of culture is going to come
about using instruments that are based on organization
theories that never considered culture as an issue to be
dealt with in the first place.
For example, I have encountered the argument that
Likert's Systems One to Four are, in effect, cultures, so
some version of the Survey of Organizations can supposedly be
used to measure organizational culture. From the clinical
perspective the main problem is that such instruments may
measure the wrong dimensions at the wrong level of depth.
Where I have been asked to help an organization decipher its
culture, what I typically discover is that the important
Ill
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dimensions of culture may have nothing whatever to do with
how people are handled, yet that is what the Survey of
Organizations and other such surveys are primarily concerned
with. For example, in terms of basic shared underlying
assumptions, which is how I define elements of culture, the
most important shared assumptions in a company are often
assumption about product type and quality, its basic image of
what business it is in, how one brings products to market,
what customers are like, whether the right way to function is
to be customer driven or product driven, whether one should
go into debt or always be self-sustaining, whether to go
public or remain private. I have found that companies build
strong shared assumptions around such issues, and those
assumptions dominate decision making and strategy. How will
I discover these dimensions if I go in with a prepared
questionnaire or interview schedule, based on someone's
oversimplified typology of organizations?
What is my clinical alternative as a process consultant?
First of all I do not agree to help an organization decipher
its culture unless it has some problem it is trying to solve.
To do a full analysis of a culture would require years of
ethnographic work and would still leave one wondering whether
the description had utility or not. On the other hand, when
some senior managers want help in figuring out whether or not
their culture aids or hinders their efforts to pursue a new
strategy or to make some organizational changes, then we have
a basis for moving forward.
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I define culture as the sum total of what a given group
has learned as a group, and this learning is usually embodied
in a set of shared, basic underlying assumptions that are no
longer conscious but are taken for granted as the way the
world is (Schein, 1985). The visible, hearable, and feelable
artifacts of an organization are a manifestation of those
underlying assumptions, as are the articulated and espoused
values that often get written down as the company's
philosophy.
Given that the essence of the culture is the shared
underlying assumptions, the next step is to get the group
that wants to solve a problem to come together as a group to
learn to decipher its own culture. The composition of the
group should depend on the nature of the problem the company
is trying to solve, and this will typically be worked out by
the process consultant working directly with the client to
determine the pros and cons of various alternative groupings.
In one recent case the problem was to identify in a
culturally diverse company that had grown up by a series of
acquisitions how to identify areas where common policies and
practices were needed as the company moved forward into an
uncertain future. In effect, the company wanted to know what
components of its various sub-cultures should be a common
culture. It was agreed that all the senior corporate
managers and division general managers had to be present for
this analysis.
-
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In another case, a company was running a senior
management development program which focused in part on a new
strategy that the company was implementing. In this case
they decided simply to insert one full day session on
organizational culture to examine how the strategy would be
impacted by the culture. I have had as few as five and as
many as 100 in a room engaging in this type of activity.
The first diagnostic intervention with the group is to
spend 30 minutes outlining how I view culture as a learned
set of shared basic assumptions that become unconscious but
manifest themselves as various artifacts and espoused values
(See Chart 1). I point out that culture can be analyzed at
the level of artifacts, the level of values, and the level of
shared underlying assumptions.
The next step is to ask the group to describe its own
major artifacts and to record all of these on a set of
flipcharts which are hung around the room . It is important
to start with concrete artifacts so that we have plenty of
data to look at when we later try to infer underlying
assumptions. By the way, a good way to start this discussion
is to ask the people with the lowest seniority to start by
telling what it was like to enter this organization.
Working in a group is essential because members stimulate
each others' thinking and we are, after all, seeking data
about a construct that is by definition shared. Shared
things are easier to locate in a group than to infer from
individual interviews.
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Filling up the walls with flipcharts listing artifacts
almost always leads into a discussion of the values, some
explicit and espoused, some more taken for granted and in
need of surfacing. By the time we have spent two hours
doing this, some of the underlying assumptions become quite
obvious and, more importantly, the domains in which important
assumptions are held become obvious. As the consultant I try
to emphasize through filling up the flipcharts that culture
is both extensive and intensive, and that not everything in a
culture is relevant to a problem one is trying to solve. So
identifying the relevant domains becomes an important part of
the exercise.
In trying to articulate assumptions, historical
reconstruction becomes very useful. Identifying the values
and attitudes of founders, early leaders, and current
powerful figures in the organization makes concrete what
members often feel only as vague abstractions. Asking the
group about major events, crises or otherwise, focuses on how
assumptions influence what was perceived and learned at those
times.
An important point that surfaces from this way of doing
things is the essential neutrality of culture. Group members
soon realize that their cherished way of doing things is not
the only way, and that there is no such thing as a good
culture or a bad culture. Only by referencing the problem
they are trying to solve is it possible to decide whether any
given cultural assumption will aid in solving the problem,
Ill
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will hinder the solution, or is irrelevant. To make this
determination becomes the next part of the task for the
groups. Either as a total group or in sub-groups, the
participants now continue to identify shared assumptions and
sort them into those that will aid and those that will
hinder. What is often surprising to participants at this
stage is to view cultural assumptions as something that can
aid them. We have come to think of culture too much in terms
of negatives and constraints instead of positive forces to be
nurtured. If constraining assumptions are identified, one
can now shift the discussion to the possible mechanisms by
which those aspects of the culture might be modified,
neutralized, or reframed in terms of even higher order
assumptions.
The role of the consultant in this process is to stage
manage the activity, to provide the theoretical framework
within which to discuss culture, to remind the group of the
organizational problem it is trying to solve (why we are
doing this), and to ask provocative questions to elicit
deeper levels of data than the participants might have come
up with on their own. As more data are out, the consultant
can certainly begin to reveal her own hypotheses about some
of the deeper assumptions that may be shared, but she must
keep her clinical hat on at all times to insure that whatever
confrontive interpretations are made, they will be seen as
helpful and will elicit more data.
20
Let me give some examples of how this works. Some years
ago a group of managers from a large insurance company met to
discuss the need for their company to become more innovative
and flexible. They had a new CEO who had mandated various
kinds of programs that should stimulate innovation but
nothing had happened for a year or more. During the morning
of this meeting the total group of 75 articulated various of
their artifacts-- dress codes, office layout, pay systems,
working hours, etc. The results seemed to reflect a fairly
traditional kind of organization reflecting values that they
cared about their customers, that they were good to their
employees in a paternalistic way, and that morale was
generally high. But innovative behavior was non-existent.
The participants then were sent off in groups of 10 to
spend two hours after lunch to analyze the various
assumptions they had begun to articulate, specifically from
the point of view of aiding of hindering innovation. In the
reports back a dramatic discovery was reported by every
group. They had realized that over the 75 year history of
this company two central assumptions about people and work
had dominated: 1) The assumption that people work best when
you given them rules to cover all contingencies, so the
company had procedure manuals that covered everything; and
2) they also had been living with the assumption that the
only way you can keep people focused on the rules is to
immediately punish any deviation from the rules. In other
words, they had been operating from a theory of human nature
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that had built a powerful control system which, in turn,
guaranteed that no-one would take any risks and innovate.
This insight produced a dilemma that management then had
to grapple with. Should one try to change an assumptions
that had been operating for decades, realizing that this
might itself take a number of years, or could one reframe the
problem to actually take advantage of the rule bound culture
by, for example, making a new rule that every employee must
contribute at least one new idea a week, or mandating that
each company practice had to be reviewed each year. Taking
advantage of the existing culture is always an easier change
strategy than to try to change deeply held cultural
assumptions.
In the conglomerate group previously mentioned, small
heterogeneous teams were sent off to identify what elements
of their cultures should be blended to create a stronger
common culture eventually. As they analyzed their
assumptions in a historical context, quite a different
insight emerged. They realized that they had all developed
under strong founders and when they had been acquired it had
been the policy to let each division continue to operate in a
very autonomous fashion. In most cases these founders had
been strong paternalistic father figures but they had all
died or retired by the time this meeting was held. In recent
years they had begun to miss these strong leaders and longed
to recapture a sense of strong central leadership. What they
really wanted was strong father figures not a common culture.
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In fact, they realized that a strong common culture would
interfere with the autonomous ways of operating that they had
all become used to.
They were able to reframe and redefine their problem as
follows: 1) How to identify areas of their business where
they needed higher levels of coordination and common
practices; and 2) How to develop strong leaders in each of
their separate divisions. They realized that they neither
needed nor wanted strong corporate leadership because in fact
their various businesses were quite different from each other
and their cultural diversity was a real competitive
advantage. A few common policies would be helpful, but they
did not need a "common culture."
Solving problems through reframing parts of the culture
is a common organizational change process. For example, this
kind of reframing can be seen in companies that committed
themselves to policies of no layoffs, based on the assumption
that their people would always be a valuable asset, only to
find that technological changes and economic cirsumstances
forced them into layoffs. One way that this has been handled
is to invoke an even higher order assumption like "we always
treat our people fairly or well," and then to create various
kinds of transition programs which get people out but with
generous buyouts, extensive outplacement, career counseling,
and other services.
This clinical process of dealing with culture does not
produce for the researcher a complete publishable account of
III
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that organization's culture, but it provides a much better
picture of culture dynamics than would have been elicited
from interviews or questionnaires, and, possibly, even
participant observation. Most important, it identifies
fairly rapidly, often within one day, those cultural
assumptions that are salient and relevant to a particular
organizational problem. That is far more helpful to
organizations than months of interviewing and surveying, and
important new data are revealed as the clinician/consultant
watches the organization deal with its own cultural
realities.
IV. Clinically Revealed Data: An Illustrative Example
How then does this method help the research process,
what new insights do we get from this kind of clinical
consulting work? The most obvious gains are in the
opportunities such data provide to observe dynamic forces
that would ordinarily be concealed, especially regarding the
operation of power and influence across organizational
boundaries. In the culture analysis area I have tried to
show what kinds of insights emerge from the actitivity
itself. By way of a further answer, let me give another case
illustration. In a bank that was trying to introduce an
effective new technology for handling various financial
transactions, it was only when the actual installation of the
new multi-product workstations was begun, that it became
evident that the bank had a powerful unbreakable norm that it
would not lay anybody off and that it would not be able to
IIIl
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relocate the many persons who would be displaced by the new
technology. The existence of the norm was well known, but no
one had any idea of how powerfully held it was until the
technological change was attempted. The new technology was
at this point abandoned as impractical.
In the traditional research model the existence of this
norm would be a sufficient explanation of the observed
phenomena. But what I learned as a consultant to the head of
this unit "deepens" our understanding considerably. Once we
discovered that the no layoffs norm was operating, I began
inquiries about the source of the norm and learned that it
was strongly associated with my client's boss for whom "no
layoffs" was a central management principle that he had made
into a sacred cow. Though I had assumed from prior knowledge
of social psychology that norms are upheld by group members
themselves, I found in this situation that it was the boss's
fanaticism that was really the driving force, and this was
confirmed three years later when he retired. All the
attitudes about layoffs changed rapidly, but, surprisingly,
the new technology still was not introduced.
By the way, as a traditional researcher I would not have
been able to hang around for so long, so I would not even
have discovered that the constraint on the new technology was
something other than the no layoffs norm. To explain further
what was happening I had to draw on some other knowledge I
had gained as a member of the design team for the initial
change. I remembered that the group had had great difficulty

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in visualizing what the role of the new operator of such a
terminal would be and what the role of that person's boss
would be. The group could not visualize the career path of
such an operator and could not imagine a kind of professional
organization where such operators would be essentially on
their own. I asked a number of people about the new
technology and confirmed that people did not see how it could
work, given the kinds of people who were hired into the bank
and given the whole career and authority structure of the
bank.
So what was really in the way of introducing the
innovation was not only the norm of no layoffs, but some
deeper conceptual problems with the entire socio-technical
system, specifically an inability to visualize a less
hierarchical system in which bosses might play more of a
consultant role to highly paid professional operators who,
like airline pilots, might spend their whole career in some
version of this new role. In fact, the no layoff norm might
have been a convenient rationalization to avoid having to
change deeper cultural assumptions about the nature of work
and hierarchy in this bank.
So what the clinical process revealed was that the
phenomenon was overdetermined, multiply caused, and deeply
embedded in a set of cultural assumptions about work,
authority, and career development. We were dealing with a
complex system of forces, and once this system was understood
as a system, it became obvious why the bank did not introduce
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the new technology. Attributing it to the boss with his
norms of no layoffs would have been a misdiagnosis even
though all the surface data indicated that this was a
sufficient explanation.
V. How Valid is Clinically Obtained Data?
Hanging around organizations in a clinical consultant
role reveals a lot, but, one can argue, this is shaky
knowledge. How do clinician researchers know when they know
something? I think the most basic answer to this question is
that if one is observing dynamic processes, one confirms or
disconfirms one's hypotheses continuously. As a matter of
training, one should operate with self-insight and a healthy
skepticism so that one does not misperceive what is out there
to make it fit our preconceptions. But if we are reasonably
careful about our own hypothesis formulation and well trained
in observing what is going on, we should be able to generate
valid knowledge of organizational and cultural dynamics
throughout any period of interaction with an organization.
For me the problem with clinical data is not that it
lacks validity, but that it is often not relevant to what I
might like to study. The psychological contract with my
client entitles me to go deeper, but not really to change the
subject and broaden it to some research concerns I might
have. On the other hand, we know so little of organizational
dynamics, especially at the power centers, that I am glad to
be allowed a glimpse of any part of this dynamic process in
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order to inform me on what I should in the future be
studying.
VI. Implications for Education and Training
If we take this point of view seriously, what does it
say about our graduate education and training. I would not
wish to abandon the teaching of research as a logical process
of thinking, nor do I want to abandon empiricism. In fact,
my view of clinical research in that it deals with
immediately observed organization phenomena is more empirical
than much research that basically massages second and third
order data. What is needed then is better training in how to
be helpful and how to be a genuinely observant, inquiring
person.
Some suggestions come to mind. Why dont we send all our
graduate students off into organizations to help them with
something. Would it be that hard to locate organizations
that would take interns for six months to a year not to
subject themselves to research but have an intelligent
energetic extra hand to work on some immediate problems? The
more immediate and practical the problems the better.
Students would learn helping and inquiry skills fairly fast
if they knew they would need them during their internship.
Why dont we teach our students basic interviewing and
observational skills? Instead of learning how to analyze
tests or surveys, students might spend more time analyzing
the everyday reality they encounter in a real organization.
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Why dont we use more clinical materials in our graduate
programs such as the recent books by Hirschhorn (1988, 1991),
Kets de Vries (1984a; 1984b), Levinson (1972) and others who
try to lay out more systematically some of the dynamic
processes they have observed?
Why dont we put much more emphasis on self-insight so
that future clinician researchers can get in touch with their
biases early in their career as a way of clarifying their
vision?
VII. Conclusion
The bottom line to all this, then, is that we need
clinical skills for generating relevant data, for obtaining
insights into what is really going on, and for helping
managers to be more effective. we need more journals and
outlets for clinical research, for case studies that are real
cases, not demonstration cases to make a teaching point. We
need to legitimate clinical research as a valid part of our
field and start to train people in helping skills as well as
in research skills. And we need more insight into our own
cultural assumptions to determine how much they bias our
perceptions and interpretations of what is going on. Our
whole field needs to recapture the spirit of inquiry that
Warren Bennis so aptly described back in 1970's as the
hallmark of organization development.
Now, am I preaching to the choir or am I a voice in the
wilderness? My feeling when I look at journals and at
meeting programs and at tenure review processes that I am a
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voice in the wilderness, but am slowly gathering some
support. I think the traditional positivistic research
paradigm has shown itself too often to be an emperor with no
clothes, so it is time to try something new. And that
something new is to go back to good oldfashioned observation
and genuine inquiry in situations where we are trying to be
helpful. The ultimate challenge for the researcher is to
find roles for herself in which she can be helpful, and the
ultimate challenge for graduate education in our field is to
train our doctoral and masters students in how to be helpful.
Certainly our organizations need help. Isnt it more
important to try to help them and learn in the process than
to make a sacred cow out of a research paradigm that produces
neither valid knowledge nor help. I think I am asking many
of you to re-examine your own assumptions and to reframe your
own thinking in a major way. Are you brave enough to try it?
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